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Abstract:
We draw on 120 years of biographical data (N = 120,764) contained withinWho’s Who—a
unique catalogue of the British elite—to explore the changing relationship between elite
schools and elite recruitment. We find that the propulsive powerofBritain’s public schools
has diminished significantly over time. This is driven in part by the wane of military and
religious elites, and the rise of women in the labor force. However, the most dramatic
declines followed key educational reforms that increased access to the credentials needed
to access elite trajectories, while also standardizing and differentiating them. Notwith-
standing these changes, public schools remain extraordinarily powerful channels of elite
formation. Even today, the alumni of the nine Clarendon schools are 94 times more likely
to reach the British elite than are those who attended any other school. Alumni of elite
schools also retain a striking capacity to enter the elite evenwithout passing through other
prestigious institutions, such as Oxford, Cambridge, or private members clubs. Our anal-
ysis not only points to the dogged persistence of the “old boy,” but also underlines the
theoretical importance of reviving and refining the study of elite recruitment.
*Aaron Reeves and Sam Friedman are joint lead authors of this article, and both contributed equally.
†International Inequalities Institute, London School of Economics, a.reeves@lse.ac.uk
‡Department of Sociology, London School of Economics, s.e.friedman@lse.ac.uk
§Department of Sociology, University of Oxford
¶Department of Sociology and Human Geography, University of Oslo
1
IǇǍǋǈƽǎƼǍǂǈǇ
Democratizing access to education was supposed to create more equal societies, where ev-
eryone had the same opportunities irrespective of who their parents were or the school they
attended (Jefferson 1817; Mill 1859). Yet an extensive body of research now offers a sober-
ing corrective to this lofty ideal. Even though the widespread provision of free schooling has
certainly reduced inequalities in educational attainment (Breen and Jonsson 2005), scholars
working across a range of national contexts—but particularly in the United Kingdom and the
United States—have found that the expansion of public education has largely failed to equalize
relative opportunities in the labor market (Goldthorpe 2016; Parman 2011; Pfeffer and Hertel
2015; Rauscher 2016).
One limitation of this work, however, is that it tends to look at rather broad categories of occu-
pational or economic destination. We thus know a lot about how educational reforms affected
entry into “big classes” of occupations or income thresholds, but little about how these shifts
affected access to more specific destinations, such as the elite. Educational reforms may have
been especially significant for this groupbecause recruitment to elite positions has traditionally
been strongly associated with certain educational pathways directly affected by the democra-
tization of schooling (Khan 2012; Stanworth and Giddens 1974). For example, elites in the
United Kingdom, United States, Australia, Canada, Japan, and France all have strong ties to a
small set of private secondary schools that have historically acted as key training grounds for
future leaders. The specific number of institutions differs across national contexts, but the core
features are the same: a classical academic curriculum, distinct extracurricular activities, and
a boarding school structure all combine to provide an unmistakable educational experience
which signals elite status to occupational gatekeepers who grant advantages that are hoarded
from outsiders (Bourdieu 1996; Carroll 2008; Goldfinch 2002; Hartman 2007; Kingston and
Lewis 1990; Useem 1984).
Yet educational reform may have had particular ramifications for the signaling power of these
elite schools; reforms both increased the pool of candidates able to compete for elite positions
and introduced standardized national credentials that attempted to level the academic playing
field. Although educational reformsmay therefore have failed to increase aggregate rates of so-
cial mobility, theymay have succeeded in weakening certain inequality-generating institutions
within the education system and, in turn, reduced the relative advantage enjoyed by alumni of
these elite secondary schools.
The United Kingdom is an ideal context to explore these questions. Not only does it have a
history of radical educational reforms, but it also possesses a centuries-old legacy of gendered
public schools, which carry a remarkable legacy for incubating male leaders. For example, of
the 54 PrimeMinisters elected to office in Great Britain, 36 (67 percent) were educated at one
of just nine elite schools. During the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, this small set
of Clarendon schools1 —consecrated as the “Great Schools” by the Clarendon Commission in
1861—were widely considered “the chief nurseries” of the British elite, defining institutions
1These schools, which cater primarily for children aged between 13-18, are: Charterhouse, Eton, Harrow,
Merchant Taylor’s, Rugby, Shrewsbury, St Paul’s, Westminster, and Winchester College.
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that prepared their male-only alumni (old boys) to take up positions of power across politics,
law, business, culture, and themilitary (Honey1977; Steedman1987;Walford 2012). Today, the
distinct characteristics of these schools remain largely unchanged and their alumni continue to
exert a profound influence. For instance, the two key politicians on either side of the “Brexit”
debate—David Cameron and Boris Johnson—both attended the most prestigious Clarendon
school, Eton College.
Yet although these elite schools continue to confer advantage, the degree to which they are able
to propel “old boys” into elite destinations, and how this has changed over time, is largely un-
known. Until now, the kind of large-scale longitudinal data source needed to answer this kind
of question simply has not been available in Britain, or indeed anywhere else. The extraordi-
nary dataset we draw on here—120 years of biographical data contained withinWho’s Who, an
unrivalled catalogue of the British elite—therefore provides a unique opportunity.
Specifically, we useWho’s Who to explore the degree to which Clarendon schools, along with a
wider group of elite “HMC schools,” have remained pivotal to elite recruitment over time. We
then go a step further to examine the institutional channels throughwhich these schools propel
their alumni, documenting the independent and cumulative advantages that flow from attend-
ing Britain’s elite public schools, Oxford and Cambridge Universities, and private members
clubs.
Taken together, our results indicate that the power of Britain’s elite schools has declined sig-
nificantly over the past 120 years. This, we argue, has been driven partly by the weakening
representation of military and religious elites and the rise of women in the labor force. How-
ever, we also find that the most dramatic periods of decline followed the implementation of
educational reforms increasing access to the credentials needed to achieve elite destinations.
Educational reforms also helped standardize and differentiate the nature of these credentials.
Notwithstanding this decline, our analysis also underlines that elite schools remain tremen-
dously powerful channels of elite recruitment. Even today, alumni of the nine Clarendon
schools are about 94 times more likely to reach the British elite than are individuals who at-
tended any other school. Moreover, their propulsive power is not necessarily contingent on
funnelling their alumni into Oxbridge or private members clubs. Public schools endow their
students with a striking capacity to reach the elite even without the aid of these other institu-
tions.
RƾǏǂǏǂǇǀ ƺǇƽ ǋƾƿǂǇǂǇǀ Ǎǁƾ ǌǈƼǂǈǅǈǀǒ ǈƿ ƾǅǂǍƾ ǋƾƼǋǎǂǍ-
ǆƾǇǍ
Elites have disproportionate access to, and control over, a range of economic, social, cultural,
and political resources (Khan 2012). Accordingly, a long-standing concern in the sociology
of elites has been who gets to deploy those resources and, more specifically, their social and
educational composition (Hartmann 2007; Mills 1956). The key issue at stake in this literature
is the degree to which processes of elite recruitment enact forms of social closure, or how
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social collectives restrict access to resources and opportunities to a limited circle of the eligible
(Parkin 1979; Tilly 1998; Weeden 2002).
Elites’ social and educational backgrounds are not the only the grounds on which closure may
be enacted in processes of recruitment. Closure can take place around any social or physical
attribute, “whatever suggests itself most easily” (Weber [1922] 1978:342). However, where the
skew in elites’ social or educational origins is especially striking, scholars have long considered
this highly suggestive of the axes onwhich closure occurs (Giddens and Stanworth 1974). In the
context of education, closure is often connected to particular educational institutions (Barberis
1996; Bourdieu 1996; Cookson and Persell 1985) Here passage through prestigious schools
acts as a status marker in and of itself and also as a proxy for collectively valued dispositions,
skills, and knowledge inculcated via rarefied curricula and extracurricular activities. In turn,
gatekeepers, such as employers, recognize these signals and provide individuals with access to
elite positions that are hoarded from outsiders (Bol and Weeden 2015).
Elite closure haswide theoretical significance. When elites are drawn fromnarrow educational
backgrounds, they are more likely to develop “a unity and cohesion of consciousness and ac-
tion” which, in turn, may have profound implications for the exercise of power (Scott 2008:35;
see alsoDomhoff 2006; King andCrewe 2013). This thesis ismost prominently associatedwith
Mills (1956:64–67; 278–83), who argued that the shared experience of elite schooling played a
key role in “fusing psychological and social affinities” among the U.S. “Power Elite.” This com-
monality, he argued, “tends to make members of the power elite more readily understood and
trusted by one another,” to “sympathise with one another’s point of view”; in short, “to say to
one another: he is, of course, one of us.” In Britain, Scott (1991: 102-117) has made similar
arguments about the role of elite private schools in maintaining the “cohesion” and “solidity”
of Britain’s “upper circle,” and Jones (2015: 5-6) has developed this through the idea of an “Es-
tablishment,” bound together “by common economic interests and a shared set of mentalities”
oriented around “protecting the concentration of wealth in very few hands.”
For these reasons, elite recruitment was central to sociological inquiry through much of the
twentieth century. In particular, a number of classic studies—particularly in the United King-
domandUnited States—probed the social origins of elite groups and howpassage through par-
ticular elite schools, universities, and clubs facilitated a later entry to elite positions (Dahl 1961;
Domhoff 1967; Giddens andStanworth 1974; Guttsman1974; Kelsall 1955;Mills 1956; Useem
1984; Useem and Karabel 1986). However, from the 1980s onward, this tradition of elite stud-
ies was somewhat eclipsed by class-structural approaches to social stratification—particularly
in the United Kingdom. Goldthorpe, Llewellyn, and Payne (1980), for example, argued that by
focusing on the social composition of “who gets ahead,” earlier approaches failed to place pat-
terns of elite recruitmentwithin the context of broader shifts in the class structure, particularly
the postwar expansion of the salariat. This class-structural approach instead emphasized mo-
bility rates between “big social classes” using nationally representative survey data. Given the
relatively small size of these surveys, and the corresponding invisibility of elite groups within
them, elites have thereby largely “slipped from view” (Savage and Williams 2008:3).2
2A number of Scandinavian researchers are an exception (see Ellersgaard, Larsen, andMunk 2013; Flemmen
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Rising inequality during the latter part of the twentieth century—particularly at the top of the
income distribution—has prompted a strong renewal of interest in (mainly economic) elites
across the social sciences (Savage 2014). Yet analysis of the educational composition of such
groups has been largely absent from this new research agenda. We attempt to revive the sociol-
ogy of elite recruitment and underline its importance to elite studies and scholars of education.
In doing so, we also aim to refine the way the topic is studied in two important ways.
SƼǁǈǈǅǌ, EǅǂǍƾ RƾƼǋǎǂǍǆƾǇǍ, ƺǇƽ EƽǎƼƺǍǂǈǇƺǅ Rƾƿǈǋǆ
First, work on elite recruitment has been hampered by an insufficient focus on how the com-
position of elites changes over time. Most prior studies provide a cross-sectional snapshot
of elite composition (Dargie and Locke 1999; Domhoff 1967) or examine a single profession
(Barberis 1996; Kelsall 1974; Thompson 1974). We remedy this by providing a much richer
temporal perspective and a more wide-ranging measure of the British national elite.
Our analysis focuses on the preparatory power of elite secondary schools. Such schools, we ar-
gue, offer an especially useful lens throughwhich to look at elite recruitment over time (Kelsall
1955). This is because most enjoy long histories and persistent levels of prestige, yet belong
to a sector—education—that has experienced significant change over the course of the twenti-
eth century. Across advanced economies, widespread educational reforms have democratized
access to education3 and, according to some, promoted greater social mobility (Breen 2010;
Lambert et al 2008; Prandy and Bottero 2000). This may have had important ramifications for
the signaling power of elite schools. For example, in a U.K. context, a number of historians
have suggested that expanding access to education significantly increased the pool of candi-
dates able to compete with public school boys for elite positions (Turner 2015; Walford 1986;
Weinberg 1967).
We add conceptual precision to this hypothesis. In particular, we stress that educational re-
forms both standardized and differentiated the credentials offered by U.K. schools (Kerckhoff
2001). When credentials are not standardized (i.e., tests are not judged according to the same
criteria), elite gatekeepers are more likely to make decisions based on informal criteria and
impute “talent” to candidates based on the perception their school represents a status marker
(Lamont, Beljean, and Clair 2014). The standardization of educational credentials at a na-
tional level, however, partially neutralizes these school-level effects, meaning a “pass” becomes,
at least in theory, more comparable across schools (Kerckhoff 2001). Moreover, introducing
finely graded differences in the quality of the credential (i.e., differentiating credentials) fur-
ther pushes evaluators to move beyond the school in recruitment decisions (Roach 1979). Of
course, this does not fully eradicate school-level effects; an A from Eton likely remains more
powerful than anA from elsewhere. However, processes of standardization and differentiation
certainly made credentials more comparable and therefore, in turn, may have undermined the
relative advantage of elite schools in securing elite destinations for their alumni.
2009; Hansen 2014; Hjellbrekke et al. 2007; Larsen, Ellersgaard, and Bernsen 2015; Ljunggren 2016; Strømme
and Hansen 2017).
3For example, in 1830, around 27 percent of British children were enrolled in a primary school; by the late-
1960s, this had risen to almost 100 percent (Lindert 2004).
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However, many scholars have resisted this hypothesis. As noted in the introduction, the con-
sensus view is that extensive educational reform has been remarkably ineffective in improving
relative life chances, particularly in the United Kingdom (Boliver and Swift 2011; Goldthorpe
2016). Many argue that elite schools have been particularly adept at adapting and respond-
ing to such reform (Domhoff 2006; Levine 1980; Scott 1991; Stanworth and Giddens 1974).
For example, Khan (2011) argues that although radical social change across the 20th century
applied pressure on elite schools to increase access to minority groups, this did not necessar-
ily dent their propulsive power for the dominant majority. Elite preparatory schools in the
United States, he notes, responded to the collectivist movements of the 1960s by opening their
doors to previously excluded groups, such aswomen and ethnicminorities, and then presented
themselves as the torchbearers for meritocracy, rewarding ability rather than ascribed charac-
teristics. However, this adoption of meritocratic rhetoric obscured the fact that these schools
continued to admit mainly individuals from privileged backgrounds, and continue to be pow-
erful vehicles for elite recruitment (Kennedy and Power 2008; Khan 2012). The promise of
greater equality through increasing access to education has thus “proven to be a fiction” (Khan
2011:17).
The United Kingdom—with its centuries old legacy of Great Schools and radical educational
reforms—is an ideal context to adjudicate this debate. Over the past 140 years, the structure of
British education has shifted significantly from a voluntary system combining fees and char-
itable institutions to a compulsory system that is largely state-funded with a small fee-paying
sector. This transition began in earnest with the 1890 Elementary Education Act, which re-
duced fees for state elementary schools, and was extended under the Fisher Act of 1918 and
then the Education Act of 1944, which raised the compulsory school leaving age to 15 (later 16)
and abolished all fees. These reforms also introduced a standardized qualification, the School
Certificate, which became the first unified secondary school examination system for the coun-
try, and differentiated credentials by providing subject specific grades.4
Until now, the type of data required to understand how these reforms affected elite recruit-
ment (i.e., containing a large number of observations, significant temporal reach, and individ-
ual school information) have not been available. Instead, scholars on both sides of the elite
schooling debate have largely speculated on processes of change, drawing on limited archival
material (Turner 2015), context-specific observational data (Khan 2011), or theoretical argu-
mentation (Miliband 1969). The Who’s Who data we draw on here thus provides an unprece-
dented opportunity: we can explore both the degree to which schools have remained channels
of elite recruitment, and to what extent any shifts in their power coincide with major educa-
tional reforms.
4The territorial extent of these reforms varies somewhat. For example, the 1890, 1918, and 1944 reforms all
initially applied only to England andWales, but similar reforms were implemented in Scotland within one to two
years.
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CǁƺǇǇƾǅǌ ǈƿ EǅǂǍƾ RƾƼǋǎǂǍǆƾǇǍ: BƾǍǐƾƾǇ SƼǁǈǈǅǌ ƺǇƽ DƾǌǍǂǇƺ-
ǍǂǈǇǌ
The second limitation of existing work on elite recruitment is that it fails to disentangle the
relationship between the different institutions through which elite formation may take place.
Most empirical work, for example, examines the association between one type of institution
and recruitment, such as elite schools (Cookson and Persell 1985;Maxwell andAggleton 2016),
elite universities (Clark 2014; Rubinstein 1986), or privatemembers clubs (Bond2012; Domhoff
1974).5 This relationship has been most clearly developed, theoretically, by sociologists of ed-
ucation, in terms of the functioning of elite educational institutions. Summarizingwork in this
area, Stevens and colleagues (2008) explain that institutions like elite schools and universities
perform four main functions: first, they are “sieves” for regulating the mobility processes that
underlie the eventual allocation of elite positions; second, they are “incubators” where elite
identities coalesce and take shape; third, they are “temples” that provide entrants with legiti-
mate forms of official academic and cultural knowledge; and fourth, they are “hubs” that bring
together and commingle a wide array of elites.
We develop these conceptual tools further, arguing that they are not only useful for under-
standing the functioning of discrete institutions, but they also help us understand connections
between elite institutions. Specifically, we argue that they are useful in elucidating channels of
elite recruitment that often describe an individual’s passage between, or pathway through, suc-
cessive elite institutions. Elite schools are often theorized as the institutional starting point of
elite trajectories, but their ability to act as such is often strongly mediated by their connections
to elite universities and private members clubs. Here we briefly explore these channels.
Themost established pathway connecting elite schools with elite destinations is the intermedi-
ary of a prestigious university (Putnam 1977). Historically, the sieve function of elite universi-
ties has rested on admission procedures that inherently advantage elite school alumni (Gamsu
2016). This can happen either via particular school–university sponsorship relationships, by
privileging sporting or extracurricular activities disproportionately incubated in elite schools
(Bernstein 1977; Van Zanten 2009), or by demanding consecrated academic knowledge, such
as Latin and Greek, only inculcated in certain schools (Karabel 2005). Finally, this elite path-
way rests on the hub function performed by elite universities, whereby individuals from elite
schools use elite universities to further cultivate networks and incubate particular worldviews
initially established at school (Persell and Cookson 1985). This illustrates that the contribution
of elite university attendance to an eventual elite destination may often be contingent on pre-
university experiences; and it is precisely this dual incubation—school and university—that
provides distinct cumulative advantages later in life. AsMills (1956) famously remarked, there
are “two Harvards”: one for a closely networked set of “old boys” and one for everyone else.
Private members clubs also perform this elite hub function (Domhoff 1974). Clubs, like uni-
versities, are sieves, often directly selecting new members based on school background (Bond
2012) or indirectly through resources incubated at such schools (Scott 1991). More impor-
5Some studies, such as Stanworth and Giddens (1974) and Maclean, Harvey, and Chia (2010), do combine
data on all three institutions, but the impact of each on elite recruitment is only considered independently.
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tantly, work in this area has focused on the way clubs bring these old boys together, providing
an institutional apparatus for them to convert homophily established at school or university
into a more tangible form of social capital (Taddei 1999; Useem 1984). In the U.K. context, this
process has traditionally been captured through the folk concept of the “old boys’ network,”
which describes an enduring set of social connections and an ethos of mutual support among
former pupils of elite public schools. According to Scott (1991), London’s male-only members
clubs represented the key mechanism through which the old boy networks forged at school
(and often further nurtured at Oxbridge) could be maintained. Many clubs had links with par-
ticular schools, with Eton alumni more likely to join clubs with larger numbers of Eton “old
boys” (Bond 2012).
Finally, elite schools may incubate resources that pupils draw on in an unmediated way to gain
access to elite pathways. Early sociological work, for example, emphasized how elite boarding
schools function as “total institutions” that provide, through formal and hidden curricula, a
strong secondary socialization (Wakeford 1969; Weinberg 1967). Central to this socialization
is the inculcation of what Bourdieu (1986) calls “embodied cultural capital,” that is, highly valu-
able dispositions manifest “in vocabulary and inflection, styles of dress, aesthetic tastes, values
and manners” (Collins 1979:126–27). In the U.K. context (and to a lesser extent the United
States), this set of dispositions was historically embodied in the understated, cultured figure
of the gentleman. Mastery of this cultural identity, with its attendant set of appropriate be-
haviors, values, and recreations, was seen as a key signal of elite status in the late-nineteenth
and early-twentieth centuries (Honey 1977; Scott 1991). Many of the cultural coordinates of
this gentlemanlymotif have eroded in the contemporary era, particularly those associatedwith
the comportment of the aristocracy. However, Miles and Savage (2012) argue that a modern
strand of gentility—deftly combiningmodesty and a knowingmode of cultural consumption—
remains highly valued in elite circles.
In sum, sociological and historical literature points toward a range of channels through which
elite schools propel their pupils into elite positions. Yet most of this work focuses on particular
institutions, and we know of no work that explores, empirically, the different institutional
pathways to recruitment that flow from elite schools. Here again, Who’s Who offers a unique
opportunity; it provides data not just on specific schools but also particular universities and
clubs. This allows us to examine the extent to which elite schools deliver elite destinations via,
or independent of, other institutions and how these different elite channels have changed over
time.
Wǁǈ’ǌ Wǁǈ: A CǈǇǌƾƼǋƺǍƾƽ NƺǍǂǈǇƺǅ EǅǂǍƾ
Before wemove to our analysis, it is important to explain howwe conceptualize national elites.
The recent revival of elite studies—much of it inspired by thework of Piketty and Saez (2006)—
is dominated by economic definitions of elites. In particular, this work tends to focus on eco-
nomic thresholds, such as the 1 percent, the super-rich, the wealth elite, high net-worth indi-
viduals, or members of various Rich Lists (Burrows et al. 2017; Keister 2014; Piketty 2013).
Such conceptualizations have the virtue of being precise, but at the same time ignore the im-
portance of elites operating in fields such as politics, culture, media, and academia, where the
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command of disproportionate resources is not always or only economic (Khan 2012).
Here we draw on a wider conception of elites that represents a powerful cross-fertilization
of both positional and reputational definitions. Mosca (1939) famously argued that elites are
best understood as “ruling minorities,” empowered through relations of authority and usually
occupying formal top positions in organizational hierarchies (Scott 1997, 2001). This was the
theoretical logic informingMills’s (1956:4) understanding of the elite as individuals occupying
“pivotal positions . . . in command of the major hierarchies and organizations of modern
society.” Others argue that elites are more usefully identified in reputational terms as those
thought to be powerful or important by those “in the know” (Hunter 1953) or as individuals
occupying some form of centrality in high-status networks (Ellersgaard, Larsen, and Bernsen
2015).
We base our analyses on Who’s Who, the leading biographical dictionary of “noteworthy and
influential” people in the United Kingdom, published in its current form every year since 1897.
Who’sWho primarily documents a positional elite; 50 percent of entrants are included automat-
ically upon reaching a prominent occupational position in one of multiple professional fields.
For example, Members of Parliament, Peers, Judges, Ambassadors, FTSE100 CEOs, Poet Lau-
reates, and Fellows of the British Academy are all included by virtue of their office (for a list of
occupational titles, see Part A of the online supplement).6 In this way,Who’s Who incorporates
most of the Mosca-Millsian ruling minorities who occupy pivotal positions in British society.
The other 50 percent are selected each year by a board of long-standing advisors who make
decisions based on a long-list of potential entrants compiled byWho’s Who editorial staff. This
part of the selection process has long been shrouded in mystery and the subject of muchmedia
speculation (Crick and Rosenbaum 2004; Paxman 2007). KatyMcAdam, Head of Yearbooks at
Bloomsbury, explained to the authors in an interview that this process is not influenced by pol-
iticking and entries cannot be purchased:7 “It’s our job to reflect society, not to try and shape
it.” Instead, she underlined that the long-list is based on independent research into individu-
als who have recently achieved a noteworthy professional appointment or sustained prestige,
influence, or fame. This therefore adds an important reputational dimension, withWho’s Who
making assessments of importance and noteworthiness based on a person’s perceived impact
on British society.
Moreover, althoughWho’s Whomay make selections based on a mix of positional and reputa-
tional grounds, all entrants are united by inclusion in the book itself, which acts as a marker of
consecration in its own right. Indeed, Who’s Who does not simply catalogue those who attain
particularly prominent positions or reputations, but it further adds to this recognition by pub-
licly constructing them as important through their inclusion. In this way, Who’s Who plays
a uniquely performative role in reflecting and actively constructing a national British elite
widely recognized throughout British society. This legitimacy or symbolic capital has been
6Who’s Who also includes hereditary members of the Aristocracy (Dukes, Marquesses, Earls, Viscounts, and
Baronets).
7In certain countries, including the United States, there are long-standing concerns that some entrants pay
for inclusion inWho’s Who (Carlson 1999).
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underlined at various points in history. For example, during the Second World War, Winston
Churchill personally intervened to ensure the publication ofWho’s Whowas not affected by the
paper shortage, regarding its full circulation to be of “national importance” (Oxford University
Press 2017). Even today, new entrants are the subject of widespread national media attention
(Fitzwilliam 2010; OxfordUniversity Press 2017), and the book’s title has passed into everyday
parlance as a casual byword for eliteness.8
Who’s Who has been used extensively by elite scholars in the past (Boyd 1973; Denord et al.
2011; Griffiths, Miles, and Savage 2008; Kirby 2016; Miles and Savage 2012). However, this
work typically extracts small subsamples from the dictionary or looks at data from only a few
time points (Priest 1982). In contrast, we draw on all entrants from all editions, lending our
analysis unprecedented temporal and empirical scope.
MƾǍǁǈƽǌ
DƺǍƺ ǌǈǎǋƼƾǌ
In November 2016, after extensive discussions with Oxford University Press and Bloomsbury
Publishing—the two publishing companies producing Who’s Who—we successfully brokered
access to all data collected by the publication since it began including full biographical details
in 1897.9 No researcher thatwe knowof has ever gained access to the entire historical contents
of the database.
Who’s Who contains two separate but connected data sources: (1)Who’s Who and (2) Who Was
Who. Who’s Who is the current directory of every individual included in the published version
of the book, consisting of around 33,000 short biographies. This represents approximately .05
percent of the current U.K. population (or 1 in every 2,000 people).10 When a person included
in Who’s Who passes away, their record is transferred into Who Was Who. We combine these
datasets and treat them as one, referring to it collectively as Who’s Who. Together, these two
datasets contain 135,319 records.
A nontrivial number of individuals are known by two ormore names and therefore havemulti-
ple entries (e.g., name changes due tomarriage). We exclude duplicate records (identified using
a matching algorithm) and retain only those that contain full and current (or latest available)
information for each individual. There is also somemissing data. For example, a small number
do not provide their year of birth; we removed these individuals fromour cohort analysis. This
gives us a final sample of 120,764 individuals.
8Who’s Who is widely used as a noun denoting “a group of the most important people involved in a particu-
lar subject or activity.” In the Merriam-Webster dictionary, the most prominent synonym for the term is “elite”
(http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/who’s%20who).
9The two lead authors (AR and SF) signed a nondisclosure agreement with the publishers, so the data will not
be made publicly available.
10The size ofWho’s Who, relative to the U.K. population, has remained remarkably stable over time. The 1905
edition had around 16,500 entrants, accounting for about .04 percent of the U.K. population. Who’s Who has
certainly expanded in size over this period, but it still constitutes only about .05 percent of the U.K. population.
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We provide descriptive statistics of the sample by birth cohort in Part B of the online supple-
ment. Notably, women constitute only 23 percent of themost recent birth cohort, even though
this number has grown steadily over time. The number of foreign-born entrants has also in-
creased, making up 5 percent of the most recent birth cohort (1965 to 1969). The average age
at which individuals are included inWho’s Who is 50, but this is only available for the past 30
years. Part C of the online supplement shows cohorts by nine occupational fields.
Kƾǒ Ǐƺǋǂƺƻǅƾǌ
We are principally concerned with data within Who’s Who that help us explore elite schools,
universities, and privatemembers clubs. First, we turn to schools. Respondents provide details
of the specific pre-university schools they attended. Here we are particularly interested in
four types of secondary schools: (1) Clarendon schools (currently around .17 percent of school
pupils age 13 to 18), (2) private schools in the Headmasters’ and Headmistresses’ Conference
(HMC) (currently 2.5 percent of all pupils), (3) other private schools (currently 4.5 percent of all
pupils), and (4) any other school. The Clarendon schools are the nine male-only public schools
most synonymous with the term “old boys,”11 and we therefore refer to them as constituting
the building block of a strong version of elite schooling. The HMC schools constitute a wider
network of 209 largely male-only public schools (including the Clarendon schools); together,
we refer to them as representing the weak version of elite schooling. Finally, we derive a list of
other private schools from two sources: (1) the current list of registered private schools in the
United Kingdom and (2) available histories of previously private schools.12
Second, we look at university education. Here we are principally concerned with Oxford and
Cambridge, as theywere, and still are, themost prestigious universities in theUnitedKingdom.
Third, we consider memberships of private, members-only clubs. The vast majority of the
clubs listed are private and London-based, such as The Athenaeum, The Carlton, The Reform
Club, and White’s; they were, until recently, male-only (some, like the Beefsteak Club, are still
male-only).
AǇƺǅǒǌǂǌ
To explore whether the relationship between schooling and elite recruitment has changed over
time, we conduct a cohort analysis based on a series of birth cohorts born between 1830 and
1969. This allows us to cover over a century of British society, ranging from approximately
1897 (when the oldest people in our sample would have been about 67) until the present day.
We define cohorts as five-year periods, for example, 1830 to 1834 and 1835 to 1839. We take
this approach tomaximize the sample size for each cohort and to smooth out any year-on-year
11Today, not all Clarendon schools are male-only. Westminster (since 1973), Shrewsbury (since 2008), and
Charterhouse (since the mid-1970s) now take women in the sixth form (ages 16 to 18). Rugby has been fully
co-educational since 1992. However, across the period we are interested in (1830 to 1969), these schools were
male-only. Even HMC schools—the weaker version of the old boys’ network—only provided about 3 percent of
places to women during the 1970s (Walford 1986).
12We focus on current private schools because they were the ones able to survive the shift to state-funded
schools in the 1970s.
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fluctuations. The smallest cohort contains 1,397 individuals, and the largest contains 5,773.
Most cohorts (20 out of 28) have more than 4,000 individuals (see Part B of the online supple-
ment). We restrict our analysis to these birth cohorts because the number of individuals born
either side of this period is smaller (fewer than 1,000 individuals).
We conduct the cohort analysis by plotting trends over time for different groups. These time
series plots allow us to narratively explore changes in elite recruitment. To formally assess
whether there are changes in the composition of Who’s Who between cohorts, we estimate
structural break models for each school type. A structural break represents a durable shift in
the data generating process of a time series. In particular, we use endogenous techniques for
detecting structural breaks, where the algorithm uses only the data to learn and detect where
the breakpoints lie.13 Methods testing formultiple structural breaks therefore assume the tim-
ing and number of structural breaks are unknown a priori and are ideal for testing “the effec-
tiveness of policy changes,” such as educational reforms, by comparing “the estimated break
date with the effective date of a policy change” (Bai and Perron 1998a: 3). This does not mean
we are testing the impact of specific reforms; instead, we are searching the data inductively for
shifts.
Weuse annual data (140 observations)with a three-yearmoving average to estimate thesemod-
els. Following the applied econometric literature (Bai and Perron 1998a, 1998b), we stipulate
that (in all models) the minimal number of observations between structural breaks is 21 years,
which represents a trimming percentage of 15 percent. This ensures that estimated break
points are not random noise but significant shifts in the series. There are more than 12,000
possible combinations for each time series (Bai and Perron 1998a); we select the best fitting
model according to the Bayesian Information Criterion and the residual sum of squares.
We calculate odds ratios to estimate the association between different types of schooling and
entry into Who’s Who. To do this, we compare the composition of Who’s Who with a baseline
population drawn from Census data. Our baseline comparison is the over-35 population, be-
cause very few people inWho’s Who are under age 35 (around .6 percent of current members of
Who’s Who) and this is commonly considered the age at which occupational trajectories solid-
ify (Goldthorpe et al. 1980). To avoid sampling on the dependent variable, we use this data to
calculate the number of people born in particular cohorts and then to estimate the odds ratios
of reaching Who’s Who by school type. More details on the data used to estimate these odds
ratios are provided in Part D of the online supplement.
We also situate the importance of schools in relation to other elite institutions. Here, we are
particularly interested in whether attending Oxbridge or a private members club is a helpful
step in reaching the elite, regardless of whether an individual attended an elite school. To
estimate these odds ratios, we draw on archival sources, such as university admissions data
from Clarendon and HMC schools along with publicly available data on entrants to Oxford
13Weuse the pre-eminent test in applied research, whichwas proposed theoretically in Bai and Perron (1998b)
and then further developed empirically in Bai and Perron (1998a). This is based on a dynamic programming algo-
rithm that obtains global minimizers of the sum of squared residuals, whereby a large set of breaks are estimated
from the possible sets of breaks to see which combination produces the best fit.
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and Cambridge. Finally, we utilize data from Whitaker’s Almanack, which has recorded the
number and size of elite clubs since the 1850s (for details on all sources, see Part D of the
online supplement).
Archival sources and census data may still contain measurement error, leading to imprecise
estimates of odds ratios. As a robustness check, we therefore calculate upper and lower in-
tervals for our estimates, assuming that the true value may be between 10 percent above or
below the value reported in archival sources. Estimates of these upper and lower intervals are
not confidence intervals and do not necessarily function in the same way (discussed in more
detail in Part E of the online supplement); rather, they are sensitizing devices to help capture
the degree of uncertainty in our estimates and account for potential measurement error in the
ratio of Clarendon alumni inWho’s Who compared to those who are not.
RƾǌǎǅǍǌ
Tǁƾ DƾƼǅǂǇƾ ǈƿ Ǎǁƾ Oǅƽ Bǈǒ
We begin our analysis by exploring the changing educational composition ofWho’s Who across
birth cohorts born between 1830 and 1969. Specifically, in Figure 1, we plot the proportion of
entrants in each cohort who report attending Clarendon, HMC, private, or all other schools.
There is a clear downward trend over this period in the proportion ofWho’s Who entrants who
have attended a Clarendon school (Figure 1). Among those born in the 1840s, approximately
20 percent had attended one of these nine schools, whereas the figure has dropped to 8 percent
among the most recent birth cohort. Compare this with all HMC schools (the Clarendon plus
other HMC schools): during the Victorian era, as these schools expanded in number and size,
they supplied a larger share of the elite. This peaked among individuals born between 1905 and
1914, when around 50 percent ofWho’s Who had attended anHMC school. After this peak, just
prior to WWI, there was a relatively modest fall, which has stabilized since WWII at 31 to 32
percent of all entrants.
Of course, these data do not incorporate the underlying population from which the people
inWho’s Who are drawn, and so do not necessarily reveal anything about the changing role of
elite schooling in elite recruitment. To address this issue, we compare individualswho attended
Clarendon schoolswith all others in that birth cohort by calculating the number of people born
over a five-year period from census records. Among people born between 1845 and 1849, the
odds ratio of being included in Who’s Who for Clarendon school students versus all others is
273.69 (lower = 248.50; upper = 303.31). This means that someone born in 1847who attended
a Clarendon school was approximately 274 times more likely to end up in Who’s Who than
someone born in the same year who did not attend one of these nine schools. If we move
forward to our last cohort (those born between 1965 and 1969), we see a significant decline:
someone born in 1967, for example, who attended a Clarendon school is approximately 67
times more likely to end up inWho’s Who.
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Figure 1: Who’s Who Entrants by School Type, 1830 to 1969 Cohorts
EǑǉǅƺǂǇǂǇǀ Ǎǁƾ DƾƼǅǂǇƾ ǈƿ Ǎǁƾ Oǅƽ Bǈǒ
One possible driver of this downward trend may be the changing occupational composition
of the British elite and, in particular, the waning significance of the military and the clergy.
Reflecting the decline of the British Empire, the military elite in Who’s Who fell precipitously
throughout the twentieth century (for full details, see Part C of the online supplement). This is
significant because military elites have a well-established and long-standing connection with
Clarendon schools (Cookson andPersell 1985;Macdonald 1980); a connection that, as Part F of
the online supplement illustrates, has been consistently stronger than other sectors. Similarly,
the secularization of British society since the Victorian era coincides with substantial declines
in the number of religious leaders in Who’s Who, another sector with long-standing links to
Clarendon schools (Bishop 1957). To unpack the potential significance of these declines, we
conduct a counterfactual analysis (Part G of the online supplement) estimating the proportion
ofWho’sWho thatwould have come fromClarendon schools if the relative size of the clergy, the
military, and all other occupational sectors had remained unchanged. In Figure 2, we plot the
percentage-point difference between the counterfactual and actual proportion of Clarendon
school alumni in each cohort.
Figure 2 confirms the modest compositional significance of religion and the military relative
to other occupational changes inWho’s Who. In particular, among the 1965 to 1969 cohort, our
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Figure 2: Counterfactual Analysis of the Percentage of Clarendon School Alumni inWho’s Who
Had the Relative Size of All Occupations Remained Constant over Time
Notes: To calculate the counterfactuals, we assume that the military, for example, constitutes the same proportion
of Who’s Who in each cohort. This in then applied sequentially to each field. More details are available in Part G
of the online supplement.
counterfactual suggests that the proportion of Clarendon school alumni in Who’s Who would
have been 1.35 percent higher if the relative size of the clergy had remained the same over time,
and 2.42 percent higher if the relative size of the military had remained the same over time.
However, if we freeze the entire occupational structure of Who’s Who in 1830 and assume it
was completely stable for the entire period (i.e., we sum every line in Figure 2), we find that
only a small part (around 10 percent) of the change in the proportion of Clarendon school
alumni inWho’s Who is attributable to changes in the occupational composition of the elite (see
Part G of the online supplement).
Aside from occupational shifts in Who’s Who, there have also been profound changes in the
number ofwomen and foreign-born entrants (see Part B of the online supplement). During this
period, theClarendon schools remainedmale-only and largelyBritish. Increases in the number
of female and international entrants in Who’s Who may thus reflect an important increase in
the competition faced by Clarendon alumni. We test this by comparing the main time trend
for Clarendon schools with the same time trend if we exclude all women and foreign-born
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entrants (see Part H of the online supplement). We find that these changes make only a small
difference (around 2 percentage points among the 1965 to 1969 cohort).
Beyond compositional shifts, another potential driver of change may be the combined effect
of educational reforms in Britain. As outlined in the introduction, these reforms transformed
access to education, eventually enabling nearly all young people to attend school (until age 16),
and potentially undermining the signalling power of elite schools. To investigate this hypoth-
esis, we conduct a series of structural break tests that first examine inductively when potential
breaks in the recruitment of old boys emerge, and second, whether the number and temporal-
ity of the breaks in these time series coincide with three key education reforms: (1) the 1890
reforms to the Elementary Education Act (affecting most keenly those born from 1880 on-
ward), (2) the 1918 Fisher Act (implemented in the mid-1920s and affecting individuals born
from 1915 onward), and (3) the 1944 Education Act (implemented between 1949 and 1951 and
affecting those born after 1935).
In each case, the staggered nature of the reforms suggest that if they meaningfully altered the
power of the Clarendon schools, then any change would most likely appear once the reforms
were fully implemented. In fact, Figure 3 shows that, despite the large number of possible com-
binations for each time series (over 12,000), the estimated structural breaks occur in periods
remarkably similar to the timing of two main education reforms. Alumni of all three types of
private schools experienced substantial declines in elite recruitment following introduction of
the 1918 Fisher Act and the 1944 Education Act.14
Simply identifying structural breaks in these time series does not reveal that the decline in
Clarendon alumni is strongly associated with educational reform. To explore this hypothesis
further, we estimate time series regression models (see Table 1) examining whether the long-
run decline is associated with four measures of educational outcomes that can be viewed as
proxies for these reforms: (1) the proportion of government spending on education (percent
GDP) when any given cohort was age 10, (2) the proportion of the adult population without
any formal schooling when any given cohort was age 35, (3) the number of children enrolled
in school when any given cohort was age 10 (as a proportion of children age 0 to 14), and (4)
the number of people attending university when any given cohort was age 20 (as a proportion
of the population age 15 to 24). We use proxies because if the decline in Clarendon schools
is explained by educational reforms, then we would expect it to be temporally correlated with
other education-related outcomes that should also be affected by these policy changes. In each
case, these proxies are correlated with the decline in Clarendon alumni.
Of course, other covariates may also explain these associations between educational outcomes
and the decline in elite schools. We therefore include four possible confounding covariates in
our regression models, each of which feature in the historical literature on this topic. First,
public school boys were frequently recruited to help govern colonies via the civil service or
14We re-estimated the structural break tests using annual data and a five-year moving average (instead of a
three-year moving average); the breaks occur in almost exactly the same years (see Part N of the online supple-
ment).
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Figure 3: Structural Break Tests and Educational Reform (Clarendon Schools, HMC Schools,
All Private Schools, and Other Nonprivate Schools).
Notes: The three education reforms are the1890 reforms to the Elementary Education Act (affecting most keenly
individuals born from 1880 onward), the Fisher Act of 1918 (affecting those born from 1915 onward), and the
Education Act of 1944 (affecting those born after 1935). We use annual data (140 observations) with a three-year
moving average for these analyses.
other government-sponsored enterprises (Skidelsky 2003). The decline of the empire from
themid-1800s onwardmay thus have restricted certain elite trajectories for Clarendon alumni
(Honey 1977). To examine this, we use the geographic size of the British Empire (as a percent of
the world’s land mass) when a cohort was age 35 as a measure of its decline. Second, as men-
tioned earlier, the Clarendon schools had strong and explicit links with the military. Major
international conflicts, however, would have required many alumni to become officers, again
potentially altering elite trajectories for those required to serve (Honey 1977). We explore this
relationship more formally by looking at defense spending as a percentage of national GDP.
Finally, Savage and Williams (2008) argue that changes in the economy, such as increased fi-
nancialization, restructured the power of certain elite factions away from the traditional elites
associated with Clarendon schools and toward a more open and diffuse business elite. To ex-
amine this, we measure (1) the international circulation of the pound sterling when a cohort
was age 35 and (2) the net surplus of the financial sector as a percent of GDP when a cohort
was age 35.
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Table 1: Time Series Regression Analysis of the Association between Education Outcomes and the
Proportion of Who’s Who That Attended a Clarendon School.
Proportion of Who’s Who That Attended
a Clarendon School (t-statistic)
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4)
Education spending (% GDP) when cohort –1.302**
was 10 years oldy (–4.81)
Adult population with no formal schooling, cohort 1.238**
age 35 (% of population age 15 to 65)y (4.51)
Number of children enrolled in school (% of –1.087**
children age 0 to 14), cohort age 10y (–2.92)
Number of university students (% of population –2.718*
age 15 to 24), cohort age 20y (–2.51)
Size of the empire (% of land mass), cohort age 35y Y Y Y Y
Money circulation (% GDP), cohort age 35 Y Y Y Y
Defense spending (% GDP), cohort age 20 Y Y Y Y
Net surplus of the financial sector (% GDP) Y Y Y Y
cohort age 35
Observations 140 140 128 68
R2 0.84 0.82 0.85 0.85
Notes: Estimates with Newey-West standard errors to adjust for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the
time series data up until the second lag. Results are the same if we difference the non-stationary covariates (see
Part I of the online supplement). We used non-differenced covariates here to use the same variable structure
across all independent variables. The results are also consistent with Granger Causality based F-tests, where
lagged measures of educational outcomes are significant with respect to the proportion of Who’s Who that
attended a Clarendon school over and above the proportion of Clarendon school alumni in the previous
period (see Part J of the online supplement). Education variables are logged to adjust for skew.
Variable sources: Defense spending (% GDP) and education spending (% GDP): Mitchell 1988 and public exp-
enditure statistical analyses. Adult population with no formal schooling (percent of population age 15 to 65):
Barro and Lee 2013; missing data has been linearly interpolated. Number of primary school students, number
of university students, and money circulation (% GDP): Mitchell 2013. Size of the empire in kilometers:
Dalio 2015; missing data has been linearly interpolated. Net surplus of the financial sector (% GDP): Thomas
and Dimsdale 2017. y - logged outcomes. T -statistic are in parentheses. * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01
Even adjusting for these four potential confounders (see Table 1), our models indicate that
greater government spending on education, more people with some formal schooling, more
children in primary school, and more university students predict fewer Clarendon alumni in
Who’s Who.15 In short, although the decline of the military and clergy, the emancipation of
women, and other unmeasured factors contributed to the decline of the Clarendon schools,
our structural break and regression analyses are consistent with the timing of educational re-
15As a sensitivity test, we re-estimated these models using the first-difference of the non-stationary variables;
our results are broadly the same (see Part I of the online supplement). We also explored whether these models are
consistent with Granger causality (Wooldridge 2010) based tests of statistical significance: a more stringent test
of a temporal association. In eachmodel, our results are consistent with Granger causality (see Part J of the online
supplement). The reverse is not true; that is, the proportion of Clarendon school alumni inWho’s Who does not
Granger-cause future education spending.
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Figure 4: The Persistence of Old Boys in Who’s Who, 2001 to 2016.
forms. This suggests that patterns of elite recruitment weremeaningfully altered following the
democratization and standardization of education.
Tǁƾ PƾǋǌǂǌǍƾǇƼƾ ǈƿ Ǎǁƾ Oǅƽ Bǈǒ
So far our results point toward a significant decline in the reproductive power of Britain’s elite
schools over time, and a concomitant opening up in terms of the composition of the British
elite. Yet it is important to stress that this decline must be viewed in a wider context of per-
sistence rather than cessation. Indeed, considering the radical changes to British society that
occurred during this period, Figure 1 underlines remarkable continuity in the force of Britain’s
elite schools. Put simply, even at their lowest ebb, nine small Clarendon schools (representing
less than 1 in every 500 pupils) still produced nearly 1 in 10 of allWho’s Who entrants.
The persistence story is further supported by Figure 4, which examines the educational back-
ground of individuals added to Who’s Who since 2001, splitting them into three distinct pe-
riods (2001 to 2005, 2006 to 2010, and 2011 to 2016).16 The figure shows the proportion of
new entrants from the Clarendon schools, all HMC schools, and all private schools together,
plotting these educational categories by the year in which individuals were added to Who’s
16Data on the year of entry is systematically available only for fairly recent additions toWho’s Who, hence the
focus on the past 16 years.
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Figure 5: Oxbridge Graduates within Who’s Who by School Type, 1830 to 1969.
Notes: The 1895 to 1899 cohort is a clear outlier among alumni from elite schools. This group turned 18 during
WWI, and therefore may have been conscripted rather than going to Oxbridge. They still reached Who’s Who in
large numbers (see Figure 1), but they did so without attending Oxbridge.
Who. Over the past 16 years, the proportion of new entrants from these elite schools remained
relatively constant (around 8 percent for Clarendon schools and around 30 percent for other
HMC schools). This suggests, then, that the decline in the reproductive power of elite schools
has largely stalled.
Finally, it is important to contextualize the profound relative advantage still enjoyed by the
alumni of elite schools. Within the current edition of Who’s Who—which naturally combines
a range of birth cohorts—9 percent of entrants attended a Clarendon school, and 32 percent
attended one of the other HMC schools. This remains a large, even gross, overrepresentation.
Comparing Clarendon graduates to individuals who attended all other schools (conservatively
assuming that .17 percent of the population have attended a Clarendon school), the alumni
of these nine elite schools are 94 times more likely to be a member of the British elite. Even
alumni of the otherHMCschools—ourweaker definition of elite schooling—are 35 timesmore
likely to be a member of Who’s Who. Notably, Goldthorpe (2016: 100)—who is not known
for sensationalist rhetoric—has described odds ratios of 6 as “unacceptably extreme” in terms
of relative mobility. The connection between elite schooling and an individual’s chances of
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reaching the British elite is therefore clearly somewhere far beyond “unacceptable.”
EǍǈǇ ƺǇƽ TǁƾǇ OǑƿǈǋƽ: Oǅƽ Bǈǒǌ ƺǇƽ EǅǂǍƾ UǇǂǏƾǋǌǂǍǂƾǌ
Our results indicate both decline and persistence in elite schools’ ability to propel individuals
into the British elite. However, it remains unclear precisely how this takes place. Is elite school
attendance alone sufficient as a channel of elite recruitment, or does the power of schools lie
more in their ability to place alumni in other elite institutions that then have the more decisive
impact on elite recruitment? We address this issue by examining the connection between elite
schools and the elite universities of Oxford and Cambridge.17
Table 2: The Association between Clarendon Schools, Oxbridge, and the Elite
1910 Now
Odds ratio Odds ratio
Different groups [Lower and Upper Interval] [Lower and Upper Interval]
Baseline: People who have not been to Clarendon or Oxbridge
Attended Oxbridge but did not 136.80 88.33
attend Clarendon school [118.75 – 161.48] [78.93 – 99.53]
Attended Clarendon but not 270.78 68.00
Oxbridge [242.99 – 310.38] [64.40 – 79.19]
Attended Clarendon and 314.32 145.18
Oxbridge [280.20 – 360.88] [131.98 – 163.61]
Notes: For 1910, we draw on a sample of Who’s Who entrants who died after 1910—and were thus still inclu-
ded in the dictionary—but were born before 1875 and were therefore at least age 35 in 1910. We use published
data sources to estimate that in 1910, .3 percent of the adult population (age 35 and over) attended Oxbridge
and .14 percent of the adult population attended a Clarendon school. Among the current cohort, .66 percent
attended Oxbridge and .17 percent attended a Clarendon school. These data triangulate with other published
statistics on how many Clarendon students attend Oxbridge. Figures in parentheses are not confidence inter-
vals. They are simulated upper and lower intervals for the odds ratio assuming that the standard deviation of
the error is 5 percent. These figures represent the odds ratio if the number of both Clarendon and Oxbridge
students were 10 percent lower (higher) than assumed for the point estimate (for more details, see Part E of
the online supplement.
Oxbridge graduates have always comprised between 30 and 40 percent of the people inWho’s
Who.18 However, as Figure 5 shows, looking at these Oxbridge graduates by the school they
attended reveals stark within-group differences. The majority of Clarendon alumni in Who’s
Who reached the elite via Oxbridge (58 percent), whereas alumni from other schools were far
17Although other U.K. universities are now regarded as elite, such as the London School of Economics, this
status has largely been acquired in recent decades, and therefore the birth cohorts we examine were largely unaf-
fected. If we look at the non-Oxbridge, Russell Group universities (equivalent to R1 schools in the United States),
around 5 percent of cohortmembers born at the end of the nineteenth century attended these universities; among
individuals born in our last cohorts, this has almost quadrupled to around 20 percent, and most of this rise oc-
curred since WWII.
18If anything, there has been a slight rise in the importance of attending Oxbridge over time, which seems
consistent with the rising importance of universities more generally.
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more likely to reachWho’sWho via other universities (71 percent). The relative power of differ-
ent institutional pathways in delivering elite destinations is less clear, however. Does everyone
attending Oxbridge have an equal chance of getting intoWho’s Who? Or do old boys from spe-
cific schools have a better chance of achieving elite destinations (Rubinstein 2008)?
Drawing on published data sources (see Part D of the online supplement), we compare the
chances of reachingWho’s Who among Clarendon school students who did and did not attend
Oxbridge in two time periods (see Table 1). First, we look at individuals who would have been
included in Who’s Who in the first decade of the twentieth century. Compared to those who
did not attend either Clarendon or Oxbridge (our reference group), attending both elite in-
stitutions dramatically increased the odds of reaching Who’s Who (OR = 314.32). Moreover,
Clarendon alumni at Oxbridge were twice as likely as Oxbridge graduates who had not at-
tended a Clarendon school to reachWho’s Who. In fact, Table 2 shows that the singular power
of attending an elite school significantly outweighed the power of attending an elite university
at this point in history.
Among current members of Who’s Who, the relationships are different in some respects but
there are also important similarities. Consistent with earlier analysis, the force of all insti-
tutional channels has declined somewhat, suggesting elites are more frequently drawn from
other institutions, including other universities. The sharpest decline has been among Claren-
don school alumni who did not attend Oxbridge. However, despite this decline, attending a
Clarendon school is still remarkably powerful. Independent of attending Oxbridge, graduates
of Clarendon schools are nearly 68 times more likely to reachWho’s Who than people who at-
tend different schools (and also do not go toOxbridge). Moreover, Clarendon school alumni at
Oxbridge continue to be approximately twice as likely to reach the elite as Oxbridge graduates
without the good fortune to attend a Clarendon school. This shows the distinct cumulative
advantages that flow from following this particular elite pathway.
Oǅƽ Bǈǒǌ ƺǇƽ PǋǂǏƺǍƾ Mƾǆƻƾǋǌ Cǅǎƻǌ
Another way in which elite schools are thought to propel their alumni into elite positions is via
their links to members-only clubs. Although club membership appears to be declining over
time amongmembers ofWho’sWho, Clarendon school alumni (and alumni ofHMCschools) are
consistently more likely to hold memberships than are other entrants (see Figure 6). Looking
across the whole of Who’s Who, approximately 60 percent of Clarendon school alumni report
being a member of a club, compared to 46 percent of HMC school graduates and 37 percent
of graduates of other schools. But, are Clarendon school graduates who are also members of
clubs more likely than other groups to reach the elite?
Again, in Table 3, we draw on published data sources to compare the chances of reachingWho’s
Who among Clarendon school students who are, and are not, members of an elite club in two
time periods. Here we see a strikingly similar pattern to our results for universities. According
to our estimates, at least 72 percent of Clarendon alumni inWho’s Who in the earliest period of
the publication were members of a club. Compared to people who did not attend a Clarendon
school and were not club members, Clarendon alumni who were club members were far more
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Figure 6: Club Membership by School Type, 1830 to 1969.
likely to be in Who’s Who (OR = 441.75). Looking at the most recent picture, we see some
striking differences. The declining power of Clarendon schools is more apparent here, even
though old boys who are club-men still have high odds of reachingWho’s Who (OR = 160.89).19
LǂǆǂǍƺǍǂǈǇǌ ǈƿ Ǎǁƾ DƺǍƺ ƺǇƽ AǇƺǅǒǌǂǌ
It is important to acknowledge that our results raise a number of theoretical andmethodologi-
cal questions that our data do not allow us to fully address. First,Who’s Who lacks a measure of
social origin. This means we are unable to explore the relationship between elite school atten-
dance and a person’s class background, and thereforewhether changes in the class composition
of elite schools explains the decline of Clarendon schools. However, we can partially address
this issue by using a proxy for class origin; that is, whether entrants’ parents hold post-nominal
letters, such as the aristocracy, British orders or decorations, PhDs (but not MAs or BAs), or
fellowships to learned societies or professional bodies. Such titles do not indicate class position
19Perhaps most surprising is the rising odds of reachingWho’s Who for those who did not attend a Clarendon
school but are members of a club. This may reflect two processes: club membership may precede or follow in-
clusion in the elite. Critically, our results do not suggest club membership follows inclusion. If club membership
increased after joiningWho’s Who, we would expect long-standing entrants to have higher rates of club member-
ship than more recent entrants, adjusted for year of birth. Instead, more recent members are slightly more likely
than older members to be club members (see Part K of the online supplement).
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in a definite way, but they do suggest these entrants come from fairly privileged occupational
backgrounds. In Part L of the online supplement, we show the proportion of Clarendon school
alumni inWho’s Who from titled and untitled backgrounds. Reassuringly, both groups show a
similar pattern of decline. This suggests the changing class origins of Clarendon alumni does
not entirely explain the decline we see in our results.
Table 3: The Association between Clarendon Schools, Clubs, and the British Elite
1910 Now
Odds ratio Odds ratio
Different groups [Lower and Upper Interval] [Lower and Upper Interval]
Baseline: People who have not between to Clarendon and are not members of clubs
Member of a club but did not 112.12 156.51
attend Clarendon school [100.08 – 127.52] [141.73 – 179.30]
Attended Clarendon but not 430.09 68.73
a member of a club [365.43 – 472.94] [60.29 – 80.43]
Attended Clarendon and is 441.75 160.89
a member of a club [405.31 – 528.38] [146.05 – 180.64]
Notes: For 1910, we draw on a sample of Who’s Who who died after 1910—and were thus still included in the
dictionary—but who were born before 1875 and were therefore at least age 35 in 1910. We use published data
sources to estimate that 1 percent of the adult population (age 35 and over) were members of clubs, and .14 per-
cent of the adult population attended a Clarendon school. Using data fromWho’s Who, we assume that 9 per-
cent of club members came from Clarendon schools during this period. For the current period, published sou-
rces confirm that .33 percent of the adult population (35 and over) are club members, and .17 percent of the
adult population attended a Clarendon school. Using data fromWho’s Who, we assume that 14 percent of club
members came from Clarendon schools during this period. Figures in parentheses are not confidence intervals.
They are simulated upper and lower intervals for the odds ratio assuming that the standard deviation of the
error is 5 percent. These figures represent the odds ratio if the number of both Clarendon students and Club
members was 10 percent lower (higher) than assumed for the point estimate (for more details, see Part E of the
online supplement).
Second, the reputational criteria used to selectWho’sWho entrants are ambiguous. This opacity
helps maintain the editorial independence of the publication, but it also limits our ability to
scrutinize the validity of selection criteria, which others argue underrepresent certain elites,
such as the super-rich and stars of popular culture (Fitzwilliam2010; Paxman2007). Moreover,
the demographic composition of the Board of Advisors, and how this has changed over time,
may also have affected who gets included. To partly address these uncertainties, we selected
a sample of entrants who were automatically included based on occupational position20 and
compared them to all others inWho’s Who (see Part M of the online supplement). The pattern
of decline is similar for both groups, indicating that our results are not entirely due to changes
in the Board of Advisors or their preferences.
20These include Members of Parliament; Fellows of the British Academy; Queen’s (King’s) Counsels, Poet
Laureate, or Fellow of the Royal Society for Literature; Member of the Royal Academy; religious leaders in the
Anglican church (i.e., Archbishops); Majors, Colonels, or Generals; Directors of the Bank of England; and Judges.
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Third, educational reform emerges as one important contributor to the weakening of Claren-
don schools. However, we acknowledge the challenges of using time series models to estimate
gradual rather than abrupt changes in the process of elite recruitment. For example, it is un-
likely that short-term (year-on-year) fluctuations in the number of children receiving a primary
education—one of our proxies for meaningful education reform—will directly affect changes
in the number of Clarendon school students in Who’s Who many years later. Rather, of in-
terest here is the gradual impact of reforms that slowly changed who was able to access elite
trajectories, something time series models struggle to identify.
We would reiterate that this highly complex phenomenon may also be driven by factors that
are hard to measure. For example, during this period many elite schools lost their sponsorship
relationship with Oxford and Cambridge, potentially undermining their propulsive power.
However, as these relationships were often informal and unrecorded, it is difficult to pinpoint
when these changes took place. Moreover, many potentially important drivers require a dif-
ferent empirical lens. In particular, our analysis is hampered by a lack of data on how elite
recruitment actually takes place in practice. A focus in future work on more concrete mo-
ments of recruitment, as demonstrated in Hartmann (2000), is thus pivotal for understanding
the precise grounds on which closure may be enacted, and how this has changed over time.
For example, the routinization of hiring and promotion processes within elite professionsmay
have weakened nakedly nepotistic recruitment processes based on old boy networks (Savage
and Williams 2009).
Finally, we recognize that our data are not without their limitations. It is worth noting, for
example, thatWho’s Who entrants can refuse to be included. According to KatyMcAdam (Head
of Yearbooks at Bloomsbury Publishing), this is very rare, but it maymatter because elites value
anonymity (Khan 2012). Relatedly, biographical entries sometimes vary in the level of detail
provided because individuals—as in other survey settings—retain some discretion over how
they complete the questionnaire. As a result, pre-university education is unavailable in a small
number of cases. However, if anything, the bias created by failing to mention schooling will
almost certainly mean we underestimate the proportion of Clarendon-educated entrants: an
Eton alumnus may fail to report their schooling, but it is very unlikely that someone reports
attending Eton, if they, in fact, did not.
DǂǌƼǎǌǌǂǈǇ ƺǇƽ ƼǈǇƼǅǎǌǂǈǇ
This article capitalizes on a dataset with unprecedented temporal and empirical scope to ex-
amine the patterns and channels of elite recruitment in Britain over the past 120 years. The
analysis reveals two key results. First, we show that the ability of Britain’s elite public schools—
both Clarendon and HMC—to deliver elite destinations has declined significantly over time.
Similarly, the institutional channels of elite recruitment that traditionally flow fromattendance
at these elite schools have also experienced a decline in relative power.
This weakening of old boy recruitment channels adds new insight to long-standing debates
about how the composition of elites shapes the exercise of power. We begin our reflections
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here by registering our skepticism that it is ever possible for sociologists to simply infer shared
cognitive dispositions from shared educational origins. This is ultimately an empirical ques-
tion, and one thatmuch previouswork tends to assume rather than investigate (Domhoff 2006;
Miliband 1969; Mills 1956). However, we echo Scott (2008) in arguing that when elites are
drawn from very specific educational channels, it is plausible that they are more likely to pos-
sess a unity and cohesion of consciousness. Yet our results question even this more qualified
assertion. Put simply, no single educational trajectory has been entirely dominant in the British
case. Individuals who attended elite schools—Clarendon and HMC—have barely ever com-
prised a majority within Who’s Who, and in the current edition they represent approximately
one in three. Even elite sectors most consistently associated with old boys, such as law, have
never drawnmore than a third fromClarendon schools. This is not to say that particular pock-
ets or fractions of Britain’s elite—past and present—have not been meaningfully dominated by
Clarendon alumni (David Cameron’s inner circle, for example, was notoriously dominated by
Eton old boys).21 This also does not mean that the elite as a whole fails to share a commitment
to general ideals, such as the value of liberal democracy and the core principles of capitalism
(Miliband 1969). Yet, beyond these rather obvious exceptions, our data certainly raise doubts
that education plays, or has ever played, a decisive role in fostering widespread cognitive unity
among the British elite.
The decline we observe also helps adjudicate between competing accounts of how elite schools
have fared as the societies around them have undergone radical change. A long line of elite
scholars in the United States and the United Kingdom have argued (or strongly implied) that
the power of elite schools has remained remarkably stable over time. Most recently, Khan has
argued that elite schools have successfully maintained their advantage by enacting a rhetorical
sleight of hand: skillfully repositioning themselves not as upholders of ascribed social advan-
tage, but as sites of meritocracy, admitting students based on individual educational excellence
and hard work, and then propelling them on the same premise. This “ruse of elite rhetoric,” in
turn, obscures the ways in which these schools continue to reward privilege, “making differ-
ences in outcome appear a product of who people are rather than a product of the conditions
of their making” (Khan 2011:185). Our results both support and problematize this account.
While we concur that deploying the rhetoric of meritocracy successfully masks many of the
contemporary functions of elite schools – a point we develop below - it is also clear that adap-
tation to radical structural change has not been seamless in the United Kingdom, and has led
to a meaningful decline in the relative power of elite secondary schools.
Moreover, rather than situating this change in the context of the political movements of the
1960s, as Khan does in a U.S. context, we trace the meritocratic turn to the impact of much
earlier educational reforms, and specifically the way they expanded access to, and standard-
ized and differentiated the form of, credentials needed to oil elite trajectories. These changes
shifted the symbolic power of the Great Schools from generalized status markers to incuba-
tors of educational excellence. But in this new, more competitive environment, although elite
21Although the roles played by these figures have changed over time, this group has included Oliver Letwin
(formerminister for government policy), Jo Johnson (former head ofCameron’s policy unit), Ed Llewellyn (former
chief of staff), Boris Johnson (Shadow Minister for Higher Education), and Rupert Harrison (George Osborne’s
former chief economic adviser).
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schools have become effective producers of educational attainment, their relative power is far
weaker than when the school itself acted as an unquestioned proxy for status. In other words,
elite schools may no longer provide educationally less meritorious alumni—epitomized in the
U.K. context by the caricatured comic figure of old-boy Tim-Nice-But-Dim22—with the same
guarantee of a future elite position.
The implications of these findings stretch beyond elite studies to the sociology of education,
public policy, and social stratification more broadly. In these fields, the overwhelming con-
sensus is that educational reform has largely failed to reduce economic and social inequalities,
particularly intergenerational mobility. Of course, our analysis cannot directly address the is-
sue of social mobility. However, our results do suggest that educational reform was successful
in undermining particular inequality-generating institutions, such as male-only elite schools.
This does not necessarily contradict work on mobility; old boys may well continue to reach
high aggregate class positions, but their ability to reach the very highest elite positions has
been significantly undermined. Put more provocatively, whereas Tim-Nice-But-Dim could
have conceivably become a Judge in 1916, he may only become a lawyer in 2016. This demon-
strates how big class or other aggregate outcome variables can obscure more localized impacts
of policy changes, as well as providing at least a partial rejoinder to the established scholarly
narrative on the power of educational reform.
Our second key result stresses the dogged persistence of the old boy. Elite schools remain
extraordinarily successful at producing Britain’s future elites; Clarendon school alumni re-
main 94 times more likely to take up an elite position than individuals attending other schools.
Moreover, alumni of elite schools are often very successful evenwhen they do not pass through
other elite institutions, such as Oxford, Cambridge, or private members clubs. Thus while a
reduction in elite recruitment from public schools is certainly noteworthy, it is important to
situate this decline in the wider contemporary context of the continuing, “unacceptably ex-
treme” (Goldthorpe 2016), relative advantage enjoyed by these old boys.
The explanatory power of Khan’s (2011) work lies in clarifying the mechanisms enabling this
persistence. His account shows how elite schools deploy the narrative of “individual self-
cultivation” to cover their students in a sheen of earned excellence, and thereby shroud the
social conditions that made their excellence possible. We would add that to further under-
stand this shift, it is useful to deploy Bourdieu’s (1996) distinction between family- and school-
mediated forms of social reproduction. Bourdieu used these concepts to understand France’s
elite universities, but in the U.K. context, they can be usefully extended to understand changes
in elite schooling.
In the past, the reproductive power of Britain’s public schools operated in much the same way
as for elite families; families ensured reproduction by the direct transfer of economic resources
whereas schools transferred a widely recognized elite status (to all students). However, as ed-
22Tim-Nice-But-Dim is a well-known TV comic character created by the British comedian Harry Enfield. He
is an alumni of a fictional elite public school who goes on to be a banker in the City of London, despite being
demonstrably dim in academic terms. His success is premised, instead, on being affable or nice.
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ucational reform and other democratizing interventions threatened elite schools’ institutional
status, they wholly embraced the school-mediated mode of reproduction. This rests on the
transfer of pedagogical resources, or cultural capital, which can then be cashed in for merito-
cratically legitimated credentials. Echoing the decline we observe in our data, Bourdieu (1996:
288) explains that this mode of reproduction is necessarily “less effective,” as not all pupils will
be educationally successful. Nevertheless, “this academic transfer compensates for its lesser
reproductive return through an increased effectiveness in its concealment of the work of re-
production.” The irony is thus that educational reforms may have undermined the power of
elite schools, but doing so may actually have cemented their long-term status. After all, the
school-mediated mode of reproduction—with its opaque cloak of meritocratic legitimacy—is
arguably much harder to challenge than older but more transparent forms.
Khan’s work also elucidates how this meritocratic turn has obscured the non-educational re-
sources that continue to flow from elite schools. Of course, elite schools do more than prime
students to achieve credentials; they also endow alumni with a particular way of being in the
world that signals elite status to others (Lamont et al. 2014). To be clear, Britain’s elite schools
no longer engender the antiquated embodied style of the British Gentleman. Rather, as Ashley
and colleagues (2015) argue, they are now more focused on cultivating broader (yet similarly
gendered) dispositions of self-presentational polish that have currency across a range of presti-
gious occupational settings. This polish manifests in particular ways of speaking and dressing
but also in more diffuse “ways of knowing”; it is “not what you learn in classes but how you
know it,” as Khan notes (2011:180). Alongside this, schools continue to develop and nurture
valuable extracurricular interests and practices, particularly in terms of sport, cultural partic-
ipation, and taste.23 These dispositions and practices do not necessarily guarantee entrance to
the elite, but they do smooth trajectories, especially in hyper-competitive settings where in-
formal notions of cultural fit are used to distinguish between candidates who are otherwise
similar in terms of credentials and experience (Ashley et al. 2015; Rivera 2012).24
Beyond these substantive concerns, our analysis also has implications for how elites are studied
in the social sciences. Our use of Who’s Who illustrates the gains that flow from investigating
new,more fine-grained empirical sources thatmay bemore accessible in a digital era. Similarly
detailed datasets are being assembled elsewhere via administrative, tax, and geodemographic
sources, but so far these have largely concentrated on economic elites (Burrows et al. 2017;
Young et al. 2016). Alongside these valuable studies, we also need sources that allow us to un-
derstand broader or more comprehensive elite populations (for an exemplar, see Accominotti,
Khan, and Storer forthcoming). In this regard, we encourage analyses of Who’s Who in other
national contexts, as well as sources such as Debrett’s in the United Kingdom or American
23This concerted cultivation is revealed clearly in the current structure of Eton’s school week: the average
student spends at least 16 hours per week formally pursuing extracurricular activities, including sport and mu-
sic. This is three times the amount spent by the average student attending any other state school in the United
Kingdom.
24This may explain why we find a stall in the decline of the old boy after WWII, and why scholars examining
the impact ofmore recentU.K. educational reforms, such as the introduction of comprehensive schooling (Boliver
and Swift 2011), find little evidence of an equalizing effect. We should reiterate that our data preclude us from
examining the effect of recent reforms on elite recruitment.
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National Biography in the United States.
Finally, these analyses underline the importance of understanding the precise channels through
which elite recruitment takes place. In the sociology of education, for example, an extensive
body of work documents how elite universities act as incubators of social and cultural capital
that have lasting effects on occupational outcomes (Steven et al. 2008). However, this literature
often neglects the potential duality of such institutions, whereby individuals entering from
specific places—such as elite secondary schools—may be better situated to take advantage of
opportunities once inside (for a recent exception, see Jack 2016). For example, no empirical
work that we know of has tried to calculate the joint relationship between specific schools and
universities in delivering elite destinations. We stress that this represents an important task for
education scholars in the future. As our results indicate, Oxbridge (and to a lesser extent clubs)
may act as elite switchboards for all, but their propulsive power is greatly enhanced if one is
doubly consecrated by a Clarendon school. In this way, we echo Mills (1956) in stressing that
there remains two distinct trajectories through Britain’s elite institutions: one for old boys and
one for everyone else.
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Part A: List of Automatic Appointments to Who’s Who
The authors requested a list of automatic appointments toWho’sWho fromBloomsbury Press
but they did not provide a fully exhaustive list. Instead, they offered an indicative guide to the
types of appointments that warrant automatic inclusion. These are listed below:
• Members of Parliament
• Members of the devolved assemblies for Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland
• Heads of local government authorities
• Judges
• Queen’s Counsels
• Senior civil servants (e.g., Head, Permanent Secretaries, Permanent Under Secretaries)
• Top level military appointments (e.g., Major, Colonel, Admiral)
• Top level religious appointments (e.g., Archbishop, Bishops, Chief Rabbi)
• Ambassadors
• Chairmen and chief executives of FTSE 100 companies
• Chancellors and vice chancellors of British universities
• Heads of subsidiary university bodies such as Oxbridge colleges (e.g., Christchurch) or
schools within the University of London (e.g., Imperial College)
• Heads of public bodies (NHS England, UK Statistics Authority)
• Heads of arts, culture, and heritage organizations (British Museum, Science Museum,
National Trust, Royal Opera House, RSC)
• Heads of science, medical, and technology organizations (British Medical Association)
• Members of the peerage and baronetage
• Heads of sports bodies (All Lawn Tennis Association, Football Association, MCC)
• Heads of certain secondary schools (e.g., Clarendon schools)
• Heads of media organizations (e.g., News Corporation, BBC, Channel 4)
• Winners of specific prizes (e.g., Booker Prize, Nobel, Turner Prize)
• Fellows of key professional bodies or institutions (e.g., British Academy, Royal Society)
• Dames and Knights
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Part B: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample by Cohort
Cohort N % Female % Who
Was Who
%
succession
% Foreign % respond
to
education
field
1830/1834 1,397 1.43 100 10.31 3.65 73.09
1835/1839 1,958 1.74 100 8.32 5.57 73.65
1840/1844 2,568 2.1 100 7.28 5.14 76.52
1845/1849 3,063 2.19 100 8.00 5.48 79.50
1850/1854 3,516 1.51 100 7.37 5.23 80.26
1855/1859 4,433 2.32 100 6.68 4.8 78.57
1860/1864 5,245 2.12 100 5.80 4.78 79.37
1865/1869 5,286 2.15 100 6.09 4.61 79.85
1870/1874 5,411 1.87 100 5.47 3.38 79.74
1875/1879 5,279 2.67 100 6.10 4.08 82.40
1880/1884 5,099 2.46 100 6.41 3.48 86.08
1885/1889 4,704 2.82 100 6.36 3.62 89.16
1890/1894 4,361 4.03 100 6.35 3.43 91.10
1895/1899 4,126 4.96 100 7.46 3.35 92.56
1900/1904 4,381 4.67 100 8.29 3.22 95.28
1905/1909 4,767 4.55 100 7.74 3.53 96.43
1910/1914 4,827 4.28 99.79 7.60 5.37 96.87
1915/1919 4,325 4.93 97.28 7.17 7.91 97.62
1920/1924 4,795 4.84 86.99 6.44 9.25 97.46
1925/1929 4,883 5.33 64.16 6.45 11.83 97.93
1930/1934 4,607 6.14 41.05 6.06 12.45 97.83
1935/1939 4,665 7.88 22.27 6.50 11.8 98.01
1940/1944 5,093 10.83 11.57 5.16 11.76 97.68
1945/1949 5,773 13.67 5.9 5.32 8.99 97.80
1950/1954 4,673 17.45 3.55 5.48 8.6 97.99
1955/1959 3,771 21.39 1.6 5.49 8.25 97.22
1960/1964 2,747 23.62 0.81 4.88 7.74 97.09
1965/1969 1,689 24.78 0.37 5.92 7.74 96.15
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Part C: Fields of Occupation by Cohort
Cohort Education Military Law Politics Business Creative
Industries
Celebrity Religion Aristocracy
1830/1834 5.53 28.17 24.25 12.43 8.52 7.98 .15 11.51 1.46
1835/1839 6.37 27.19 24.53 11.24 9.63 7.14 .17 11.18 2.55
1840/1844 7.12 22.53 24.82 13.72 8.81 8.17 .51 12.41 1.91
1845/1849 7.27 19.86 27.37 12.95 11.22 8.96 .04 9.84 2.50
1850/1854 7.33 22.12 25.43 12.84 11.17 8.66 .34 9.72 2.38
1855/1859 6.80 28.10 21.94 11.08 11.86 9.53 .34 8.20 2.14
1860/1864 8.39 29.67 19.19 11.65 11.15 9.74 .27 7.64 2.30
1865/1869 7.06 32.06 18.21 11.40 13.16 8.97 .31 6.64 2.18
1870/1874 7.44 34.12 16.23 11.42 14.07 8.36 .27 6.12 1.96
1875/1879 7.60 35.73 14.91 12.16 15.45 8.18 .39 3.52 2.05
1880/1884 8.04 34.56 13.74 12.12 15.40 8.44 .28 5.66 1.77
1885/1889 9.24 31.11 14.78 12.65 16.05 8.99 .35 4.93 1.90
1890/1894 8.48 33.52 14.10 12.19 17.51 9.10 .07 3.33 1.69
1895/1899 10.32 30.95 14.02 12.73 17.48 9.08 .26 3.35 1.80
1900/1904 13.02 20.96 15.34 12.34 20.13 10.92 .17 4.81 2.32
1905/1909 13.44 17.97 14.80 15.49 20.05 10.28 .27 4.76 2.93
1910/1914 14.77 16.26 14.46 15.87 20.67 10.58 .52 4.86 2.00
1915/1919 17.79 14.40 13.20 19.71 19.52 8.65 .79 3.97 1.97
1920/1924 21.90 9.63 12.53 17.63 22.40 9.54 .85 3.82 1.69
1925/1929 21.72 6.22 13.18 14.88 23.68 12.66 1.12 4.72 1.82
1930/1934 22.03 5.13 12.57 14.41 24.54 12.42 1.14 5.06 2.71
1935/1939 25.19 3.75 11.20 13.82 24.35 13.03 1.34 4.74 2.58
1940/1944 27.81 2.36 13.17 15.22 21.09 12.41 1.46 3.94 2.54
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1945/1949 28.30 1.98 15.60 15.69 18.45 13.07 1.21 3.21 2.50
1950/1954 27.30 2.44 17.01 16.79 15.38 13.19 1.07 3.90 2.92
1955/1959 22.07 3.24 18.19 16.81 15.27 15.72 1.17 4.14 3.40
1960/1964 18.23 2.92 19.91 17.87 14.77 18.42 1.39 3.17 3.32
1965/1969 13.92 1.48 21.62 21.15 11.26 21.03 1.66 2.25 5.63
Note: Rows may not equal 100 due to rounding. Who’s Who categorizes individuals into 25 fields. Many of these fields are quite small, so we
created nine larger aggregate categories to document the broad patterns over time. Education contains ‘Education and learning,’ ‘Medicine,’
‘Scholarship and research,’ and ‘Science.’ Military contains ‘Armed forces and intelligence.’ Law contains ‘Law and crime.’ Politics contains
‘Politics and government’ and ‘Social welfare and reform.’ Business contains ‘Business and finance,’ ‘Trade and retailing,’ ‘Agriculture and food,’
‘Building and heavy engineering,’ ‘Manufacture and industry,’ ‘Technology,’ and ‘Transport and Communication.’ Creative industries contains
‘Art,’ ‘Film, broadcasting, publishing,’ ‘Music,’ ‘Theatre and entertainment,’ and ‘Literature and journalism.’ Celebrity contains ‘Individuals,’
‘Travel and exploration,’ and ‘Sports and games.’ Religion contains ‘Religion and belief.’ Aristocracy contains ‘Royalty and aristocracy.’43
Part D: Data Sources Used to Calculate Odds Ratios
We calculate odds ratios in the standard way, but the data sources behind those calculations are drawn from a variety of sources. In the table
below, we outline some of the variables and assumptions used to calculate different odds ratios in the article. Who’s Who is the population
of interest, so we compare the Who’s Who data to the wider population (over the age of 35). The main point of uncertainty is how many,
for example, Clarendon students there are in the population or how many Oxbridge graduates there are in the population. To generate these
estimates, we use a variety of official or published sources, as detailed below.
Consider the Clarendon school students as a proportion of the population. In 1962 there were approximately 6,322 students at Clarendon
schools age 13 to 18. We want to generalize this number to the whole population in Who’s Who now, so we calculate the number of young
people age 13 to 18 usingCensus data. With these two figures, we then can calculate the proportion of the populationwho attendedClarendon
schools at that time and apply this same number to the adult population in the present. This same technique can be applied to other key
variables. Of course, to understand the joint probability of reaching Who’s Who—conditional on attending both a Clarendon school and
Oxbridge—we need to know what proportion of Oxbridge students are from Clarendon schools. These data are available for some years or
periods, and these are also reported below.
Most of these estimates rely on published sources. There are two exceptions. The data on clubs are less certain. We derive the proportion
of club members who attended a Clarendon school from Who’s Who data. This is a conservative approach because we might assume that
Clarendon school alumni who are also members of clubs may have a greater chance of reaching Who’s Who, and therefore assuming the
proportion observed in Who’s Who is the same as the underlying population may lead to an underestimate of the link between Clarendon
schools and clubs. Approximately, 14 percent of club members in Who’s Who were Clarendon school alumni in 2010. However, we assume
that the proportion of club members from Clarendon schools was lower than this number for two reasons: first, the total number of club
members was larger in 1910 (denominator) while the number of Clarendon school graduates (numerator) is largely stable and consistently
smaller than the total number of club members; second, even if every Clarendon school graduate was a club member they would still only
account for 13 percent of all clubmembers. We therefore suggest that around 9 percent of all Clarendon school graduates were clubmembers,
which is consistent with the high levels of club membership we see in Who’s Who among Clarendon alumni during the nineteenth century.
At each step we tried to take a conservative approach to ensure our estimates, while certainly containing some measurement error, are not
unduly inflated.
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Variables and
assumptions
Current
data
Source 1910 data Source
All adults >35 36024200 2011 Census 12547337 1911 Census
Clarendon
students as % of
the population
.168% In 1962 there were approximately
6,322 students at Clarendon schools
age 13 to 18 (Bamford 1967). Census
data for the proportion of the
population age 13 to 18 in 1961
were taken from International
Historical Statistics 1750 to 2010
(Palgrave Macmillan 2013).
.137% In 1845 there were around 3,500 Clarendon
students; in 1864 there were around 2,750.
Census data for the proportion of the population
age 13 to 18 in 1841 and 1861 were taken from
International Historical Statistics 1750 to 2010
(Palgrave Macmillan 2013). We calculated the
average proportion of Clarendon students as
percent of the population across these two data
points.
Oxbridge
students as % of
the population
.66% Total Oxbridge undergraduates in
1971 was 16,282. In 1949 it was
around 13,000. Again, Census data
for the proportion of the population
age 19 to 21 in 1951 and 1971 were
taken from International Historical
Statistics 1750 to 2010 (Palgrave
Macmillan 2013).
.312% Total Oxbridge undergraduates in 1890 was
5,440. In 1870 it was 4,016. Again, Census data
for the proportion of the population age 19 to 21
in 1871 and 1891 were taken from International
Historical Statistics 1750 to 2010 (Palgrave
Macmillan 2013).
Proportion of
Clarendon
students
attending
Oxbridge
39% In 1955, 39 percent of Clarendon
students were admitted to Oxbridge
(Bishop 1957). Between 1930 and
1944, a small sample of students
suggests around 44 percent had
attended Oxbridge (Wakeford 1969).
>50% Data on the proportion of Clarendon students
who attended Oxbridge is scarce and mixed. If
we take official data—which indicates the
proportion of Oxbridge graduates from
Clarendon schools and the size of Oxbridge at
the time—then we estimate that over 50 percent
(around 57 percent) of Clarendon graduates
attended Oxbridge (Honey and Curthoys 2000).
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Clarendon
students as % of
Oxbridge
20% Between 1920 and 1939, 25 percent
of Oxford students were from
Clarendon schools (the number was
slightly lower in Cambridge)
(Greenstein 1994). This has declined
since WWII; Clarendon schools now
constitute around 10 percent of
students (Sutton Trust 2008). On
average, we assume around 20
percent of Oxbridge students were
from Clarendon schools.
25% Before 1850, around 33 percent of Oxford
undergraduates attended Clarendon schools, and
this was about the same in 1867 (Bishop 1957;
Honey and Curthoys 2000). Just before WWI
this had fallen to around 25 percent (Honey and
Curthoys 2000). We therefore take a
conservative approach and assume that
approximately 25 percent of Oxbridge graduates
attended a Clarendon school across this period.
Club members as
% of the
population
.29% We use Whitaker’s Almanack to
estimate the number of clubs today.
There are 62 clubs listed in the 2010
version of Whitaker’s, a marked
decline from 105 in 1910. We
assume the average club
membership increased slightly from
1,307 in 1910 to 1,700 in 2010. We
therefore estimate there are 117,800
club members among these elite
London clubs.
1.03% Taddei (1999), using Whitaker’s Almanack and
other sources, estimates there were 129,434 club
members in 1910.
Proportion of
club members
attending
Clarendon
14% Derived fromWho’s Who data. 9% The club population was larger in 1910 and the
number of Clarendon school alumni was
smaller. We therefore assume, using Who’s Who
data as a guide, that the proportion of club
members who attended a Clarendon school was
around 9 percent in 1910.
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Part E: Calculating the Upper and Lower Intervals for the Odds Ratios
To calculate odds ratios, we relied on data from publicly available sources describing the num-
ber of Clarendon school graduates, Oxbridge graduates, and club members in the population.
We acknowledge that these data may not precisely reflect the true values in the population. To
account for this uncertainty, we calculated upper and lower intervals for our estimates using
a consistent set of assumptions. The estimated upper and lower intervals are not confidence
intervals and so do not behave in the same way; rather, they are sensitizing devices to help
capture the degree of uncertainty in our estimates and highlight the magnitude of our find-
ings. Here we describe this procedure and provide some empirical examples of the results it
generates.
Consider the odds ratios for Clarendon school students. Here we know (1) the number of
Clarendon school students in Who’s Who, (2) the number of non-Clarendon school students
inWho’sWho, and (3) the size of the underlying population. We also need to know the number
of people in the populationwho attended aClarendon school (call thisX ), andwe have publicly
available sources that can tell us what this figure (X ) might be. However, this figure is more
uncertain.
Here, then, we use a simulation procedure to estimate what the odds ratiomight look like if the
total number of Clarendon school students in the population was either higher or lower than
the number obtaine from published sources. To do this, we assume that error inX is normally
distributed with a standard deviation of 5 percent of the estimate based on publicly available
data. Assume that the estimated number of Clarendon school graduates in the population is
60,000. We then take 10,000 randomdraws from this distribution such that themean is around
60,000 and 95 percent of the observations are between 54,000 and 66,000 (two standard devi-
ations either side of the mean or 10 percent above and below the mean value). The estimated
odds ratios ifX = 54,000 and ifX = 66,000 become our upper and lower intervals – 10 percent
above and 10 percent below the mean value.
We can apply this same technique to calculate the odds ratios for specific cohorts over time.
In this case, the uncertainty is the number of Clarendon students over a five-year period. We
have this data for some but not all cohorts. For example, the cohorts reported in the main text
are based on publicly available sources. We linearly interpolate themissing data on the number
of people attending a Clarendon school in a particular cohort but, again, recognize this may
have some inaccuracies. We then use the same procedure described above, except now we
estimate these upper and lower intervals for each cohort and plot them (see Part E, Figure 1).
If we look at the trend rather than the specific point estimates we can see that, consistent with
our main results, the odds ratio are very high in the nineteenth century but decline during the
beginning of the twentieth century and then flat-line for cohorts born after WWII. Even with
these generous measures of uncertainty, the main story of our results still holds.
Next we estimate the odds ratios for the joint relationship between attending a Clarendon
school and, for example, attending an Oxbridge university. In this instance, rather than simply
estimating the total number of Clarendon students, we estimate both the number of Clarendon
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Part E, Figure 1: Odds Ratio of Clarendon School Alumni ReachingWho’sWhowith Estimates
of the Upper and Lower Intervals
Notes: The capped, vertical lines capture the range of possible estimates assuming that the number of Clarendon
students in any given cohort was somewhere within the range of 10 percent above or below the reported value.
Data on the number of Clarendon school students are not available for every cohort. For the cohorts where it is
missing, it has been linearly interpolated based on the gap between publicly available data between time points.
Black observations are based on observed data. Red observations are based on linearly imputed data. Note that
the upper and lower intervals do not function as confidence internals. Here the upper and lower intervals get
narrower for reasons that are unrelated to the precision of the estimate; rather, changes in the upper and lower
intervals reflect changes in the ratio of Clarendon school students who end up in Who’s Who.
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Part E, Figure 2: Kernel Density Estimates of the SimulatedOdds Ratios for the Joint Relation-
ship between Clarendon and Oxbridge
students and the number ofOxbridge students using the same simulation procedure, where the
standard deviation of the assumed error is equal to 5 percent of themean (or estimated number
of Clarendon/Oxbridge students). In Part E, Figure 2 we plot the kernel density estimates
from the simulations for each odds ratio. Here it is clear that even with substantial allowance
for measurement error, the differences between these odds ratios are still quite different from
each. Of course, it is possible that the degree of error is larger than 10 percent of the mean
in one direction, so these graphs should not be read in the same way as confidence intervals.
These graphs do, however, provide a sense of the degree to which these results are contingent
on the assumptions of our analysis.
Note that this procedure creates an artefactual decline in the upper and lower interval as the
ratio of Clarendon school alumni who end in Who’s Who falls. Consider the following two
examples:
1. There are 6,000 Clarendon students in the population and 100 Clarendon students in
Who’s Who.
2. There are 6,000 Clarendon students in the population and 200 Clarendon students in
Who’s Who.
a) In both scenarios, there are 4.8 million people in the underlying population and
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1,500 of these people are in Who’s Who.
In scenario 1, the odds ratio of being in Who’s Who compared to everyone else is 53.47 and
the upper interval (i.e., if the number of Clarendon school students in the populationwas 6,600
rather than 6,000) is 59.16. The lower interval (i.e., if the number of Clarendon school students
in the population was 5,400 rather than 6,000) is 48.61.
In scenario 2, the odds ratio of being in Who’s Who compared to everyone else is 106.94 and
the upper interval (i.e., if the number of Clarendon school students in the populationwas 6,600
rather than 6,000) is 97.02. The lower interval (i.e., if the number of Clarendon school students
in the population was 5,400 rather than 6,000) is 118.49.
The upper and lower intervals are twice as large in the second scenario simply because the
numerator is higher.
Although more complex procedures exist that would address this artefact—that is, scaling the
upper and lower intervals by the inverse of the number of Clarendon students in Who’s Who
(the numerator in theORs)—these are less transparent and less directly interpretable. For these
reasons, we continue to use the simple but transparent approach to calculating the upper and
lower intervals.
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Part F: Percentage of Clarendon School Alumni by Occupational Background, 1830 to 1969
Notes: We do not report data from the Aristocracy because many of them are automatically included in Who’s
Who and a far larger proportion attended Clarendon schools (65 percent among the 1830/1835 cohort and 48
percent among the 1965/1969 cohort). Celebrities are also not reported here because they are such a consistently
small part of Who’s Who.
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Part G: Counterfactual Analysis of the Percentage of Clarendon School Students inWho’sWho
Who’s Who is not entirely stable over time. For example, the proportion of military entrants
falls dramatically over this period. This is because fewer people served in the military, and
the size of the military fell as the empire shrank. To test whether the decline of the military
explains the fall in the number of Clarendon school alumni, we conducted a counterfactual
analysis. Here we estimate what Who’s Who would have looked like if the relative size of the
military – as a proportion ofWho’sWho – had remained constant (around 22 percent ofWho’s
Who). This calculation is based on the following procedure:
1. In the 1840/1844 cohort there were 74 people in Who’s Who in the military field who
attended a Clarendon school. These 74 people constituted around 22 percent of all mil-
itary people. There were 330 military entrants in Who’s Who (around 18 percent of all
Who’s Who members born in that cohort).
2. In the 1830/1834 cohort 22 percent of all Who’s Who members were military entrants.
3. We then estimate the number of Clarendon school alumni there would have been in
Who’s Who if 22 percent (the proportion of military people in Who’s Who from the mil-
itary in the 1830/1834 cohort) rather than 18 percent were in the military field (the pro-
portion of military people in Who’s Who from the military in the 1840/1844 cohort).
4. We assume that the proportion ofmilitary entrants inWho’sWho that attended aClaren-
don school is the same as the actual data in Who’s Who (74/330 = 22 percent).
5. If 22 percent of those in Who’s Who in the 1840/1844 cohort were in the military (399
people) and 22 percent of these people attendedClarendon schools, we can estimate there
would have been 89military people inWho’sWho that attended aClarendon school. This
is 15 more than actually observed.
6. If we then assume these 15 people are in fact Clarendon alumni, then Clarendon school
graduates comprise 20.43 percent ofWho’sWho in that cohort rather than 19.60 percent,
which is what we actually observe in the data.
7. In the final step we subtract the difference between the counterfactual and the actual
percentage (20.43 – 19.60 = .83 percent) and then plot this difference in Figure 2.
8. We repeat this procedure for each cohort and for every field of occupation to produce
the data in Figure 2.
We also conduct a formal counterfactual analysis across all fields. Herewe follow the same pro-
cedure but consider all fields simultaneously. In the figure below we report the original data
(i.e., the percentage of Clarendon school alumni in Who’s Who) and we report three counter-
factuals: (1)we hold the size of the fieldswithinWho’sWho constant, (2)we hold the propulsive
power of the schools constant (i.e., we assume that the proportion ofClarendon school students
in any given field remains stable), and (3) we hold the size of the field the same and we hold the
propulsive power of the schools the same.
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Part G, Figure 1: Counterfactual Analysis of the Percentage of Clarendon School Alumni in
Who’s Who
The black line is the observed data reported in Figure 1. The green line reports what the per-
centage of Clarendon school alumni in Who’s Who would have been if the composition of
Who’s Who had been stable over time. Here we see that the percentage of Clarendon school
students in Who’s Who would have been slightly higher if the composition of Who’s Who had
remained unchanged. However, if we compare the stable size (green) line with the line that
holds everything stable (blue line) we see a sizeable gap. The gap between these two lines re-
flects changes in the ability of these schools to send their alumni into the elite. Clearly, it is
changes in the propulsive power of these schools that explains most of the decline in Claren-
don schools in Who’s Who.
54
Part H: Proportion of Who’s Who That Attended a Clarendon School, with and without
Women and Other Nationalities
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Part I: Time series regression analysis of the association between education outcomes and the
proportion of Who’s Who that attended a Clarendon school, adjusting for non-stationarity in
the predictors.
We determine stationary time series using Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests to explore whether
each time series had a unit root. Following these tests, we re-estimate the main regression
model but now taking the first-differences of those variableswith a unit root, that is: number of
university students, size of the empire (percent ofworld landmass), money circulation (percent
GDP), and the net surplus of the financial sector (percent GDP).
Proportion of Who’s Who That Attended
a Clarendon School (t-statistic)
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4)
Education spending (% GDP) when cohort -2.504**
was 10 years oldy (-9.25)
Adult population with no formal schooling, cohort 3.193**
age 35 (% of population age 15 to 65)y (8.58)
Number of children enrolled in school (% of -3.246*
children age 0 to 14), cohort age 10y (-3.37)
Number of university students (% of population -15.31**
age 15 to 24), cohort age 20y (-3.19)
Size of the empire (% of land mass), cohort age 35y Y Y Y Y
Money circulation (% GDP), cohort age 35 Y Y Y Y
Defense spending (% GDP), cohort age 20 Y Y Y Y
Net surplus of the financial sector (% GDP) Y Y Y Y
cohort age 35
Observations 139 139 128 67
R2 0.66 0.69 0.44 0.44
Notes: Estimates with Newey-West standard errors to adjust for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the
time series data up until the second lag. Results are the same if we difference the non-stationary covariates (see
Part I of the online supplement). We used non-differenced covariates here to use the same variable structure
across all independent variables. The results are also consistent with Granger Causality based F-tests, where
lagged measures of educational outcomes are significant with respect to the proportion of Who’s Who that
attended a Clarendon school over and above the proportion of Clarendon school alumni in the previous
period (see Part J of the online supplement). Education variables are logged to adjust for skew.
Variable sources: Defense spending (% GDP) and education spending (% GDP): Mitchell 1988 and public exp-
enditure statistical analyses. Adult population with no formal schooling (percent of population age 15 to 65):
Barro and Lee 2013; missing data has been linearly interpolated. Number of primary school students, number
of university students, and money circulation (% GDP): Mitchell 2013. Size of the empire in kilometers:
Dalio 2015; missing data has been linearly interpolated. Net surplus of the financial sector (% GDP): Thomas
and Dimsdale 2017. y - logged outcomes. T -statistic are in parentheses. * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01
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Part J: Granger causality regression analysis of the association between education outcomes
and the proportion of Who’s Who that attended a Clarendon school.
We estimate lagged dependent variable models while including all other predictors as lags too.
We take the first lag because the model fit (using the BIC statistic) was higher for models in-
cluding additional lags.
Part J, Table 1: Fit Statistics for the Models Testing Granger Causality
Bayesian Information Criterion
1st Lag 1st and 2nd
Lag
1st, 2nd, and
3rd Lag
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Education spending (%GDP) when cohort 565.24 583.82 599.75
was 10 years old (logged)
Adult population with no formal schooling, cohort 570.58 583.84 593.51
age 35 (% of population 15 to 65) (logged)
Number of children enrolled in school (% of 511.99 530.07 552.40
children age 0 to 14), cohort age 10 (logged)
Number of university students (% of population 251.86 272.20 288.14
age 15 to 24), cohort age 20 (logged)
Notes: Includes lags of the dependent variable of the same order.
We also tested the reverse relationship—namely, whether, for example, education spending
was correlated with the proportion of Who’s Who that attended a Clarendon school in the
previous year over and above education spending in the previous year. In each case, we found
no clear correlation between lagged observations of Clarendon school alumni in Who’s Who
and future education spending.
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Part J, Table 2: Granger Causality Regression Analysis
Proportion of Who’s Who That Attended
a Clarendon School (t-statistic)
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4)
Proportion of Who’s Who that attended a .436** .485** .386** .237
Clarendon school (4.60) (4.97) (3.55) (1.62)
Education spending (% GDP) when cohort -.765**
was 10 years oldy (-4.36)
Adult population with no formal schooling, cohort .674**
age 35 (% of population age 15 to 65)y (4.22)
Number of children enrolled in school (% of -.917**
children age 0 to 14), cohort age 10y (-3.60)
Number of university students (% of population -2.672**
age 15 to 24), cohort age 20y (-3.09)
Size of the empire (% of land mass), cohort age 35y Y Y Y Y
Money circulation (% GDP), cohort age 35 Y Y Y Y
Defense spending (% GDP), cohort age 20 Y Y Y Y
Net surplus of the financial sector (% GDP) Y Y Y Y
cohort age 35
Observations 139 139 128 67
R2 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.83
Notes: Estimate with Newey-West standard errors to adjust for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity
in the time series data up until the second lag. Education variables are logged to adjust for skew.
Variable sources: Defense spending (% GDP) and education spending (% GDP): Mitchell 1988 and public exp-
enditure statistical analyses. Adult population with no formal schooling (percent of population age 15 to 65):
Barro and Lee 2013; missing data has been linearly interpolated. Number of primary school students, number
of university students, and money circulation (% GDP): Mitchell 2013. Size of the empire in kilometers:
Dalio 2015; missing data has been linearly interpolated. Net surplus of the financial sector (% GDP): Thomas
and Dimsdale 2017. y - logged outcomes. T -statistic are in parentheses. * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01
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Part K: Club Membership Is Not Higher among Those Who Have Been Members of Who’s
Who Longer, 2001 to 2016
Notes: These estimates are derived from a regression model that descriptively calculates the proportion of people
in each education category for each group of new entrants, adjusted for year of birth.
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Part L: Probability of Attending a Clarendon School by Whether the Parents Are Listed with a
Post-nominal Title
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Part M: Comparing the Probability of Attending a Clarendon School among the Members of
Who’s Who Using a Rule-Based Inclusion Criteria and the Whole Sample
Notes: The occupations or positions used for the rule-based inclusion are taken from the main occupational sec-
tions ofWho’sWho and includeQueen’s orKing’sCounsels, Judges,Members of Parliament, Fellows of theBritish
Academy, Fellows of the Royal Society for Literature, Fellows of the Royal Academy, Officers in the Anglican
Church, officers in the Bank of England, and Majors or Generals in the military. These comprise approximately
23 percent of the whole sample of Who’s Who.
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Part N: Structural Breaks for Clarendon Schools Using Different Moving Averages
3-year moving 1849 1888 1921 1941
average (main) (1848 to 1859) (1886 to 1889) (1920 to 1923) (1940 to 1942)
Annual data 1849 1889 1921 1941
(1-year) (1846 to 1864) (1886 to 1892) (1919 to 1924) (1940 to 1943)
5-year moving 1851 1888 1921 1941
average (1850 to 1859) (1886 to 1889) (1920 to 1922) (1940 to 1942)
Notes: In each iteration of the model, the 4 break version was the best fit.
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